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Transnational Governance of Workers’ Rights: 
Outlining a Research Agenda 
Abstract 
In twentieth century Europe and the USA, industrial relations, labour, and workers’ 
rights issues have been handled through collective bargaining and industrial 
agreements between firms and unions, with varying degrees of government 
intervention from country to country. This industrial relations landscape is currently 
undergoing fundamental change with the emergence of transnational industrial 
relations systems that complement existing national industrial relations systems. 
Despite the significance of this ongoing change, existing research has only started to 
explore the implications of this change for how workers’ rights are governed around 
the globe. This paper addresses this gap by outlining an agenda for future research 
into the transnational governance of workers’ rights. Fulfilling such a research agenda 
would be both challenging, as it requires combining the so far divergent industrial 
relations and business ethics research streams, and rewarding, as it provides ample 
scope for promising future research. 
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Introduction 
In twentieth century Europe and the USA, industrial relations, labour, and workers’  
rights issues have been handled through collective bargaining and industrial 
agreements between firms and unions, with varying degrees of government 
intervention across different countries (e.g., Emery and Thorsrud, 1969; Hedlund and 
Otterbeck, 1977; Bamber and Lansbury, 1998). Several comparative studies of 
industrial relations systems have revealed that these three actors – firms, unions, and 
governments – are generally viewed as exclusive to the industrial relations and 
workers’  rights arena (e.g., Dunlop, 1958; Bamber and Lansbury, 1998). As well, the 
most influential international labour institution – the ILO – is a tripartite institution 
based on these three actors. Systems of industrial relations have also predominantly 
been based on national legislation and thus differed between countries (e.g., IDE, 
1981; Piazza, 2002). Hence, industrial relations systems have historically been 
embedded in a context of national, tripartite arrangements negotiated by actors 
engaged in ongoing relationships with each other. 
This industrial relations landscape is currently undergoing fundamental change. First, 
the arenas in which industrial relations are enacted have broadened as national 
industrial relations systems have been complemented by emerging transnational 
industrial relations systems. Second, as these arenas have broadened, new actors have 
become involved in industrial relations, mainly in the form of non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) entering into transnational industrial relations systems. Third, 
these changes have meant the redistribution of actor influence in industrial relations, 
and, fourth, they have meant a shift from legally based to voluntary governance. 
Combined, these changes make it possible to argue that we have been and are 
witnessing the emergence of transnational industrial relations systems parallel to, and 
significantly different from, national industrial relations systems. The emergence of 
transnational industrial relations systems has been noted frequently in multiple 
academic disciplines, some researchers, for example, claiming it to be “one [of] if not 
the most important institutional innovations of our time” (Kochan, 2006, p. 12 – 
italics in original). 
Despite the significance of these ongoing changes, existing research has only started 
to explore the implications of these changes in how workers’  rights are governed 
around the globe. So far, research has missed the forest for the trees, focusing on only 
parts of the emerging transnational industrial relations systems or some of the links 
between the transnational and national industrial relations systems. Little, if any, 
research has systematically outlined the issues at stake in terms of workers’  rights 
governance. Consequently, critical questions for understanding ongoing developments 
have been left unexamined. This paper addresses this gap by outlining an agenda for 
future research into the transnational governance of workers’  rights. I will argue that 
fulfilling such a research agenda requires marrying two divergent research streams: 
industrial relations and business ethics.  
Fulfilling this research agenda and developing an in-depth understanding of how 
workers’  rights are governed, both nationally and transnationally, is essential for the 
progress of the business ethics field. This is so because workers’  rights governance is 
a central, though unexplored, part of business ethics. Workers’  rights are central 
because they comprise core human rights, lie at the heart of influential business ethics 
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standards, such as the UN Global Compact, and are integral to recent “sweatshop” 
debates. The business ethics literature could benefit greatly from a more in-depth 
understanding of workers’  rights governance, which would in turn help place central 
business ethics topics, such as codes of conduct, in a broader context.  
In the next section, the major changes leading to the emergence of transnational 
industrial relations systems are outlined, to provide needed background. I then discuss 
existing research into transnational industrial relations to illustrate the need for a more 
holistic research agenda. In the third section, I discuss research needs in four different 
categories: i) micro (i.e., the implications of the changes for the tools used to 
operationalise workers’  rights governance and on an intra-organisational level), ii) 
meso (i.e., the implications of the changes on an inter-organisational level), iii) macro 
(i.e., how to understand what types of transnational industrial relations systems are 
emerging), and iv) interaction (i.e., the interaction between the emerging transnational 
and existing national industrial relations systems). Finally, I conclude the paper by 
discussing the importance of fulfilling the outlined research agenda. 
A changing industrial relations landscape  
Trend I: From national governments to transnational corporations 
In recent years, it has been argued that a process of globalisation is underway, 
marking a profound shift in economic structures, institutional arrangements, and the 
organisation of work (e.g., Stiglitz, 2003; Bhagwati, 2005; Cohen, 2006). Evidence of 
this development usually includes increasing competitive pressure, global 
outsourcing, communications technology evolution, and a homogenisation of 
consumer tastes and branding (e.g., Klein, 2000). The transnational organisation of 
production started becoming prevalent in the 1980s and 1990s as European and 
American TNCs started to offshore much of their production to developing countries 
(e.g., Jones, 2005; Taylor, 2005). This trend was particularly evident in low-skill 
industries, such as the garment, footwear, and toy industries, in which TNCs largely 
pursue low-cost strategies (e.g., Christerson and Appelbaum, 1995; Hathcote and 
Nam, 1999).  
Through this offshoring of production, workers’  rights issues in low-skill and other 
industries began an ongoing geographic shift from a European and US setting to a 
predominantly Asian setting (cf. Frenkel, 2001; Schrage, 2004). In this process, the 
European and US national arenas, where workers’  rights issues have traditionally 
been negotiated, have become less relevant and, consequently, the dominant actors in 
these settings, such as national European and US governments, have lost influence. In 
contrast, the national settings of predominantly Asian developing countries have 
increased in importance. Many of these countries have fairly stringent labour laws 
similar to those in Europe and the USA, and countries such as China and Vietnam 
have recently profoundly changed their labour laws (Warner, 1996; Chan, 1998; Ding 
and Warner, 1999; Cooney et al., 2002). However, there are large gaps between 
labour law and corporate practice in these countries, especially in those with recently 
changed labour laws (Zhu and Fahey, 1999; Lau, 2001; Liew, 2001; Cooney et al., 
2002; Chen, 2003; Cooke, 2004; Frenkel and Kim, 2004).  
In practice, this means that TNCs that are offshoring production to Asian countries are 
entering national settings with little labour law enforcement. Since transnational 
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institutions for workers’  rights are not yet sufficiently developed to balance the 
offshoring trend and the weak enforcement of labour law in Asia, the workers’  rights 
situation in Asia can be characterised as ‘governance without government’  with 
TNCs, unions, and NGOs governing industrial relations (Beck, 1992; Rosenau and 
Czempiel, 1992; Strange, 1996; Christmann and Taylor, 2002; Frenkel and Scott, 
2002; Sullivan, 2003; Frenkel and Kim, 2004; Prieto and Quinteros, 2004). Paralleling 
this decreasing role of governments in industrial relations is an increase in the 
influence of transnational corporations in general (e.g., Anderson and Cavanagh, 
1996; Korten, 2001) and with respect to industrial relations in particular (e.g., Deetz, 
1992; Riisgaard, 2005). In this way, TNCs have gained and governments lost strength 
in industrial relations.  
Trend II: A weakening state of unions 
The trend towards TNC-centred industrial relations rather than state-centred national 
governance poses a considerable challenge to unions. A strategic response from 
unions has included the setting up of so-called European Works Councils, based on 
the 1994 EC directive, an ongoing process made possible by political strategies of 
labour movements seeking to pursue a legislative underpinning for transnational 
organising (Gregory and Nilsson, 2004). Even so, Hardt and Negri (2001) conclude 
that European Works Councils are unlikely to be sufficiently strong to balance TNC 
influence as the marketplace expands beyond the European setting. Unions’  legal and 
political strategies are also made increasingly difficult by the neo-liberal political 
agenda that dominates Western politics, leading to a decline in unions’  political 
influence (Wills, 1998; Connor, 2004; Eade, 2004).  
Unions’  roles and influence are also challenged by declining membership in Western 
countries (e.g., Wills, 1998, 2002) and by low or virtually non-existent membership in 
developing countries (e.g., Chan and Ross, 2003; Valor, 2005). A popular argument 
supporting this ‘secular decline’  thesis is that the collectivist ideology of unions has 
become outdated as work has become individualised (Allvin and Sverke, 2000), and 
as roles and identities are being recast around individual service production (Phelps 
Brown, 1990; Bassett and Cave, 1993) and shaped more by one’ s role as a consumer 
rather than as a producer (Giddens, 1991; Lyon, 1999). Statistics on union 
membership trends over the past twenty years also seem to support this thesis. For 
Western Europe as a whole, union membership has dropped from 44 per cent to 32 
per cent between 1980 and 1998 (Beori et al., 2001). A sharper decline can be 
observed in the USA (Gregory and Nilsson, 2004). Some countries, such as Sweden, 
Denmark, and Belgium, have been able to maintain high union membership, mainly 
due to the unions’  role in these countries in distributing state benefits (Huzzard et al., 
2004). Whatever the reason for the membership decline, these developments 
negatively affect the ability of unions to exert influence politically as well as 
economically (SIPTU, 2000). 
An additional challenge to unions resulting from the increasingly transnational 
organisation of production is the decentralisation of industrial relations (Gregory and 
Nilsson, 2004). Recent studies show that most of the EU’ s member states have 
experienced a decentralisation of their bargaining systems (Beori et al., 2001; Ferner 
and Hyman, 1998). Bamber and Lansbury (1998) concluded, in a review of industrial 
relations tendencies in ten industrial countries, that the enterprise level has become a 
more important locus of dialogue and bargaining between unions and management. 
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Evidence of this development has been found both in the US setting (e.g., Deutsch, 
1994; Appelbaum and Batt, 1994) and in a European context, as seen in Sweden 
(Nilsson, 1999; Hammarström et al., 2004), Ireland (von Prondzynski, 1998), Austria 
(Traxler, 1998), Italy, and Spain (Elvander, 2002). All these trends have reinforced 
the move to TNC-centred, rather than state-centred, industrial relations systems, while 
also weakening the influence of labour unions in such systems.  
Trend III: Rise of NGOs in industrial relations 
While governments and labour unions have lost influence n a shift from a national to 
a transnational industrial relations setting, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
are on the opposite trajectory. In the field of human and workers’  rights, the number 
and role of NGOs have increased greatly in recent decades (e.g., Boli and Thomas, 
1999; Braun and Gearhart, 2004; Riisgaard, 2005). This is related to the fact that as 
TNCs, increasingly in search of lower labour costs, have offshored production to 
developing countries, they have indirectly brought about the emergence of NGOs in 
the area of industrial relations. Since working standards were lower in these 
developing countries than in Europe and the USA (Chan and Senser, 1997; Chan, 
1998, 2000; Lee, 1998, 1999), NGOs (as well as unions) criticised the offshoring 
trend on the basis that while production could be offshored, corporate responsibility 
could not (van Tulder and Kolk, 2001; Roberts, 2003; Frenkel and Kim, 2004). This 
interaction between NGOs and TNCs is a relatively novel phenomenon, since NGOs 
have historically interacted with governmental rather than corporate counterparts 
regarding human and workers’  rights (e.g., Hartman et al., 1999; Heap, 2000; Teegen 
et al., 2004; Ählström and Sjöström, 2005). In instances in which NGOs have 
previously targeted the corporate sector, they have been focusing their initiatives on 
the informal sector where unionisation is limited (Egels-Zandén and Hyllman, 2007). 
However, there has been a shift in NGO prioritisation, with an increasing number of 
NGOs choosing corporations, particularly TNCs, as their counterparts (e.g., Hamann 
and Acutt, 2004; Rondinelli and London, 2003; Spar and La Mure, 2003; Sullivan, 
2003).  
There are several reasons for this shift. First, NGOs are increasingly broadening the 
definition of human rights to include workers’  rights. Second, as mentioned above, 
TNCs have become increasingly influential in the global economy, and consequently 
become a more relevant counterpart for many NGOs. Third, the governmental retreat 
from regulating international workers’  rights has led NGOs to perceive gaps in 
governance they can fill. With NGOs shifting from governmental to corporate 
counterparts, they have emerged as a second type of representative of workers’  rights 
alongside unions (e.g., Eade, 2004; Riisgaard, 2005; Spooner, 2004).  
Trend IV: From legal to voluntary governance 
In addition to changes in TNC, government, union, and NGO influence, there has also 
been a shift from legally based to voluntary industrial relations systems. The issue of 
transnational governance of workers’  rights has a long history. As early as the 1970s, 
workers’  rights representatives (from both labour unions and NGOs) demanded 
linkages between workers’  rights and trade (Gumbrell-McCormick, 2000). This was 
initially framed in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) system and 
then in the World Trade Organization (WTO) system. The negotiations surrounding 
this attempt are commonly known as the ‘social clause’  debate and well documented 
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in previous research (e.g., O’ Brian et al., 2000; Van Roozendaal, 2002; Fairbrother 
and Hammer, 2005; Bartley, 2007). 
In the 1990s, the limited success of campaigns linking workers’  rights and trade 
prompted workers’  rights representatives to explore alternative options, focusing 
attention on individual corporations and voluntary agreements (e.g., Braun and 
Gearhart, 2004; Compa, 2004; Fairbrother and Hammer, 2005). In this way, the issue 
of transnational governance of workers’  rights came to coincide with the increasingly 
powerful CSR trend towards voluntary ‘soft law’  regulation (cf. Esbenshade, 2001; 
O’ Rourke, 2003; Bartley, 2005; Kuruvilla and Verma, 2006). This linkage between 
the shift to voluntary governance of workers’  rights on an individual corporate level 
and the CSR trend is frequently noted in the industrial relations literature (e.g., Miller, 
2004; Riisgaard, 2005; Shanahan and Khagram, 2006; Waddington, 2006). The 
voluntary approach has been more successful than the workers’  rights–trade approach, 
with workers’  rights representatives managing to influence firms to adopt both codes 
of conduct (Schlegelmilch and Houston, 1989; Sethi, 1999; Guillén et al., 2002; 
Nijhof et al., 2003; Kaptein, 2004), and, although to a lesser extent, international 
framework agreements (Hammer, 2005; Riisgaard, 2005). Evidently, this shift from a 
legal to a voluntary governance approach has reinforced the move to ‘governance 
without government’  in industrial relations systems.  
In this paper, I will assume that the emerging transnational industrial relations systems 
are based on voluntary governance tools, such as codes of conduct and international 
framework agreements. As Bartley (2005) demonstrates, this assumption is a 
simplification of the actually complex relationships between voluntary and legal 
governance tools. In practice, voluntary tools (such as codes of conduct) could 
sometimes be turned into legal accountability for firms (Bartley, 2005). If, how, when, 
and by whom this is done are important areas for future research if we are to improve 
our currently limited understanding of the link between voluntary and legal 
transnational governance of workers’  rights. However, this topic will not be covered 
in this paper. 
From a national towards a transnational setting 
I have described a shift from traditional national systems of industrial relations 
towards emerging transnational systems. At the same time, we should be careful not 
to exaggerate this development. The fundamental change is not the collapse of 
national industrial relations systems, but rather the gradual emergence of a second 
alternate industrial system on the transnational level. There are four major differences 
between national and transnational systems. First, the arenas in which industrial 
relations are being enacted are the national versus the transnational arenas. This leads 
to the second difference, the difference in the influence of the involved actors. In 
national systems, unions and national governments occupy central positions in 
industrial relations, while in transnational systems the influence of both unions and 
national governments has diminished. Paralleling the decreases of union and national 
government influence is an increase in TNC influence. Third, in transnational systems 
a new actor, the NGO, has entered into industrial relations alongside unions as 
representatives of workers’  rights. Fourth, while national systems build on legal 
governance, the transnational systems mainly build on voluntary governance. 
Combined, these shifts make it possible to argue on a general level that we have been 
and are witnessing the emergence of transnational industrial relations systems that in 
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many ways are significantly different from traditional national industrial relations 
systems. 
Previous research into transnational workers’ rights governance 
Unlike the extensive research into national industrial relations systems, research into 
transnational industrial relations systems is sparse. Even more importantly, existing 
research into transnational industrial relations systems has focused on sub-questions, 
providing detailed knowledge about these while leaving many other relevant 
questions unanswered. The most notable and highly researched sub-question is codes 
of conduct. As reviews of research into codes of conduct indicate, there has been 
ample research into codes of conduct in recent decades (e.g., Egels-Zandén, 2007; 
Helin and Sandström, 2007; Kaptein and Schwartz, 2008), and this research has 
certainly provided valuable insight into how workers’  rights are being governed 
transnationally. However, existing code of conduct research has had a narrow scope, 
rarely looking at the more general implications of codes of conduct for transnational 
workers’  rights governance. For example, few code of conduct studies recognise, let 
alone analyse, one of the key tensions in the emerging transnational industrial 
relations systems, namely, that between codes of conduct and international framework 
agreements (IFAs). 
Recent industrial relations research has shown that IFAs have emerged as a labour–
union-driven industrial relations tool that competes with and/or complements codes of 
conduct in operationalising transnational workers’  rights governance (e.g., Hammer, 
2005; Sobczak, 2007). The main difference between codes of conduct and IFAs is 
that, while codes are unilaterally adopted by corporations, IFAs are negotiated and 
signed by both the corporation and representatives of the labour union movement. The 
problem, as shown in Egels-Zandén’ s (2008a) survey of existing IFA research, is that 
existing research into IFAs shares the same orientation as does research into codes of 
conduct, i.e., it is almost solely focused on the IFA tool and, hence, neglects to frame 
the discussion in more general terms concerning alternate ways of governing workers’  
rights transnationally.  
The purpose here is not to discredit existing research into codes of conduct and IFAs. 
Rather, the purpose is to demonstrate that, to fully understand emerging transnational 
industrial relations systems, a complementary research approach is needed, focused 
on comparing alternative governance tools (such as codes of conduct and IFAs), and 
on analysing what different types of transnational workers’  rights governance systems 
these tools represent. Hence, there is a need to complement the existing detail-focused 
research agenda with one that is more holistic. 
Such a holistic research agenda would challenge researchers to combine the so far 
divergent industrial relations and business ethics research streams. To be able to 
discuss transnational workers’  rights governance, researchers must, for example, be 
able to understand codes of conduct, NGOs, consumer pressure, and the CSR trend 
(mainly discussed in the business ethics literature), and IFAs, labour unions, industrial 
action, and national industrial relations systems (mainly discussed in the industrial 
relations literature). Today, discussions of labour unions and industrial relations are 
sparse in the business ethics literature (Michalos, 1997; Leahy, 2001; Riisgaard, 2005; 
Provis, 2006). Leahy (2001, pp. 34–35) phrases this nicely: “it seems odd that one 
could turn to these texts on managerial ethics for information on labour/management 
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and be left with the impression that unions did not exist, that managers did not have to 
negotiate with them”. Similarly, industrial relations literature has so far only paid 
scant attention to the CSR trend, the role of NGOs in industrial relations, and similar 
matters (cf. Kaufman, 2004; Riisgaard, 2005; Heery and Frege, 2006; Seeber and 
Lipsky, 2006; Waddington, 2006; Egels-Zandén and Hyllman, 2007). In the next 
section, I outline a research agenda that combines these disparate research streams and 
outlines promising avenues for future research. 
A research agenda for transnational workers’ rights governance 
Micro: Conflicting tools and intra-organisational aspects 
Codes of conduct and IFAs: Conflicting tools? 
In practice, the emerging transnational industrial relations systems have been 
operationalised and materialised in two competing governance tools: codes of conduct 
and IFAs. Hence, a logical starting point for future research into transnational 
industrial relations systems is to analyse the differences between these tools. Most 
researchers interested in IFAs touch on these differences by noting that codes of 
conduct are unilateral corporate policy documents, while IFAs are negotiated 
agreements (e.g., Hammer, 2005; Riisgaard, 2005; Sobczak, 2007). Egels-Zandén and 
Hyllman (2007) is one of the few studies that move beyond such general comparisons 
by analysing the differences between codes and IFAs in terms of workplace 
democracy, showing that IFAs include more processual aspects of worker 
representation than do codes of conduct. However, there are still ample opportunities 
for research featuring such code of conduct and IFA comparisons. A particularly 
fruitful avenue seems to be combining pre-existing thorough content reviews of IFAs 
(e.g., Hammer, 2005) and codes of conduct (e.g., van Tulder and Kolk, 2001; Carasco 
and Singh, 2003; Kaptein, 2004) as a basis for discussing the content differences 
between these two tools. Our pre-assessment of the results of such an analysis is that 
while there are some content differences between codes of conduct and IFAs, these 
are fairly marginal, i.e., on the content level, codes of conduct and IFAs are fairly 
similar. Despite this, codes and IFAs, as will be demonstrated below, represent 
significantly different approaches to workers’  rights governance. 
A second key question to analyse in future research is whether codes of conduct and 
IFAs are complementary or conflicting tools, i.e., will adopting codes of conduct (or 
IFAs) help or hinder the adoption of IFAs (or codes of conduct). Codes of conduct are 
sometimes presented as a first step towards unionisation and IFAs, since most codes 
include a clause allowing employees to organise themselves in local unions (cf. Braun 
and Gearhart, 2004; Connor, 2004; Frenkel and Kim, 2004; Hale, 2004). However, 
researchers have also argued that codes are merely TNC public relations tools, 
enabling TNCs to avoid unionisation and the signing of IFAs (e.g., Justice, 2003; 
Frundt, 2004; Roman, 2004; Lipschutz, 2004). These conflicting conceptions of the 
code of conduct–IFA relationship is worth exploring in empirical research to analyse 
whether it is possible to have transnational workers’  rights governance systems 
founded on both codes of conduct and IFAs, or whether codes and IFAs manifest two 
competing underlying ideas of transnational governance. Egels-Zandén and Hyllman 
(2007) provide a first empirical analysis of this question, but more research is needed 
into this central question for the emerging transnational governance systems. 
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Intra-organisational aspects 
In addition to research into the code of conduct and IFA tools themselves, research is 
also needed into: i) why TNCs, unions, and NGOs promote codes of conduct, IFAs, or 
both, ii) whether codes of conduct or IFAs are more effective in promoting workers’  
rights, and iii) whether there are differences between how codes and IFAs are 
implemented and transformed inside organisations. There is a need to understand how 
organisations choose, develop, and use the tools when actually implementing the 
transnational governance of workers’  rights. 
Regarding the first of these three research areas, there is ample research into why 
firms adopt codes of conduct (e.g., Weaver, 1993; Esbenshade, 2001; van Tulder and 
Kolk, 2001; Bondy et al., 2004; Graafland, 2004), and some emerging research into 
why firms adopt IFAs (Miller, 2004; Riisgaard, 2005; Egels-Zandén, 2008a). There is 
also some research into why labour unions prefer IFAs (Justice, 2003; Frundt, 2004; 
Miller, 2004; Lipschutz, 2004; Roman, 2004; Riisgaard, 2005); existing research, 
however, provides few answers as to why NGOs promote codes rather than IFAs. 
Given that codes of conduct and IFAs share the same purpose of improving workers’  
rights transnationally and that labour unions prefer IFAs, it is puzzling that existing 
research has found that NGOs (like TNCs) prefer codes of conduct (cf. Gallin, 2000; 
Riisgaard, 2005; Egels-Zandén and Hyllman, 2006). This is especially so given that 
such preferences have been shown to induce conflicts between labour unions and 
NGOs (cf. Traub-Werner and Carvey, 2002; Justice, 2003; Anner and Evans, 2004; 
Eade, 2004; Egels-Zandén and Hyllman, 2006). 
Regarding the second of the three intra-organisational areas, there is ample research 
into the effectiveness of codes of conduct in both developed and developing countries 
(e.g., Barrientos and Smith, 2007; Egels-Zandén, 2007; Helin and Sandström, 2007; 
Kaptein and Schwartz, 2008). In sharp contrast, there are fewer than a handful of 
studies of the effectiveness of IFAs (Wills, 2002; Riisgaard, 2005), making this a 
promising avenue for future research. However, for the purpose of understanding the 
emerging transnational industrial relations systems, the most interesting studies will 
be those that compare the effectiveness of codes of conduct and IFAs, providing 
insights into the tools’  comparative effectiveness. For example, it is reasonable to 
expect that IFAs might be more effective than codes of conduct in promoting union 
rights, given the influential role of unions in negotiating and implementing IFAs (cf. 
Wills, 2002; Riisgaard, 2005; Egels-Zandén, 2008a). Union rights is also an area in 
which codes of conduct have had limited success (Barrientos and Smith, 2007; Egels-
Zandén and Hyllman, 2007). On the other hand, codes of conduct could potentially be 
more effective, for example, in improving gender-related issues, since labour unions 
are generally regarded as poor in addressing these issues (e.g., Huyer, 2004; Povey, 
2004). In addition to comparing the effectiveness of codes of conduct and IFAs, there 
are also a few TNCs that have adopted both codes of conduct and IFAs, providing 
interesting empirical settings for studying the effectiveness of codes and IFAs. Hence, 
there is a need for more research into both the comparative effectiveness of codes of 
conduct and IFAs if independently implemented and the effectiveness of combined 
implementation. 
The third intra-organisational area needing more research – differences between code 
of conduct and IFA implementation – would be useful for explaining the potentially 
different effectiveness of codes and IFAs. Hence, to understand outcome differences 
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(effectiveness) between codes and IFAs, we need to understand the processes yielding 
these outcomes. Helin and Sandström (2007) demonstrate that existing code of 
conduct research has largely neglected how codes are used and transformed in 
organisations, and a similar conclusion also holds for IFA research. Hence, there is 
ample opportunity for research from a process perspective into both codes and IFAs; 
again, to improve our understanding of the emerging transnational industrial relations 
systems, the most interesting studies will be those that compare how codes of conduct 
and IFAs are implemented. Interesting research areas include the differences in 
communication and auditing between codes and IFAs. For example, the involvement 
of unions in IFAs indicates that the dissemination of IFAs versus of codes of conduct 
will rely more on union channels and less on corporate channels than will codes of 
conduct. Wills (2002) and Riisgaard (2005) provide partial support for this 
hypothesis. Similarly, greater union involvement could be expected in the auditing of 
IFAs than of codes of conduct (cf. Riisgaard, 2005; Egels-Zandén, 2008a). Central 
questions then become: i) is greater union involvement linked to greater corporate 
involvement (higher union commitment leading to higher corporate commitment) or 
lower corporate involvement (higher union commitment leading to lower corporate 
commitment), and ii) how is greater union involvement linked to implementation 
effectiveness? 
Meso: Inter-organisational relations 
NGO–union relations: An unexplored field 
As noted above, the emerging transnational industrial relations systems are dominated 
by TNCs, labour unions, and NGOs. So to understand the transnational systems, 
understanding is needed not only of tools and intra-organisational aspects (the micro 
level) but also of the relations between TNCs, unions, and NGOs (the meso level). 
TNC–union relations have already been extensively researched in the industrial 
relations literature (e.g., Piazza, 2002; Weston and Lucio, 1998; Wills, 2002), 
although mainly with respect to national industrial relations systems. Similarly, TNC–
NGO relations have received increasing attention in the business ethics literature (e.g., 
Henriques, 2001; Rondinelli and London, 2003; Argenti, 2004; Hamann and Acutt, 
2004; Teegen et al., 2004). Given this, it is surprising that NGO–union relations are so 
sparsely researched. While there are some practitioner and conceptual papers dealing 
with NGO–union relations (e.g., Braun and Gearhart, 2004; Hale, 2004; Ortez, 2004; 
Simpkins, 2004), only a handful of empirical papers consider NGO–union relations 
(Egels-Zandén and Hyllman, 2006). This is problematic for our understanding of the 
emerging transnational industrial relations systems, since previous research has shown 
that NGO–union relations are filled with conflicts (e.g., Traub-Werner and Carvey, 
2002; Justice, 2003; Anner and Evans, 2004; Eade, 2004). These conflicts exist 
despite the importance of constructive NGO–union relations for the successful 
improvement of workers’  rights transnationally, as numerous researchers have 
highlighted (e.g., O’ Rourke, 2003; Braun and Gearhart, 2004; Eade, 2004; Frenkel 
and Kim, 2004). 
There are several potential explanations for NGO–union conflicts. First, as discussed 
in the previous section, unions and NGOs have chosen different preferred tools for 
operationalising workers’  rights governance, with unions preferring IFAs and NGOs 
preferring codes of conduct. Second, as will be discussed in the next section, unions 
and NGOs operate on different macro-level conceptual bases. Third, as will be 
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discussed in this section, unions and NGOs organise in different ways and display 
differences in terms of class and gender.  
Regarding differences in how unions and NGOs organise, Braun and Gearhart (2004) 
argue that there are three main differences: i) unions are interest driven and NGOs are 
ideal driven, ii) unions have members and NGOs usually do not, and iii) unions are 
political insiders while NGOs are political outsiders (watchdogs). Although thought-
provoking, Braun and Gearhart’ s (2004) analysis of NGO–union differences is neither 
self-evident (for example, unions could be seen as ideal driven, NGOs could have 
members, and many NGOs are political insiders) nor the only possible view of the 
differences between how NGOs and unions organise (for example, another difference 
in organising could be that unions are financially self-sustained while NGOs are 
reliant on external donations and grants). Consequently, more research is needed into 
NGO–union differences in organising and how these differences influence the 
emerging transnational industrial relations systems.  
Regarding the class- and gender-related differences between NGOs and unions, 
researchers have argued that NGO–union conflicts stem from class-based cultural 
differences between unions and NGOs (e.g., Gallin, 2000; Compa, 2004; Spooner, 
2004; Yevgeniya, 2004) and/or gender-related differences between unions and NGOs 
(e.g., Huyer, 2004; Povey, 2004). Here, unions are presented as embracing: i) a 
culture of solidarity in a struggle for social change (representing a working class 
agenda) and ii) a masculine culture, while NGOs are presented as: i) being based on a 
philanthropy ideal with a welfare agenda (representing a middle and upper class 
agenda) and ii) a feminine culture. However, like most previous research into the 
NGO–union relationship, the papers identifying class and gender differences as 
central to NGO–union conflicts are rarely grounded in empirical research or in 
discussions relating these differences to the transnational governance of workers’  
rights. There is a need for future empirical research to test both these explanations of 
NGO–union conflicts. 
Third-party effects and conflicts within actor types  
The relations between two types of actors in the transnational industrial relations 
systems will have effects on other involved actors. For example, Egels-Zandén and 
Hyllman (2006) demonstrate that TNCs can use the conflict between NGOs and 
unions to their own advantage to escape expanded responsibilities. An interesting 
avenue for future research would be to continue studying such third-party effects, for 
example, by examining how the increasingly close and positive relations between 
NGOs and TNCs affect labour unions. In the same way as it is argued that codes of 
conduct could crowd out IFAs, it could be argued that positive NGO–TNC relations 
could crowd out unions in transnational industrial relations systems (cf. Justice, 2003; 
Frundt, 2004; Roman, 2004; Lipschutz, 2004). On the other hand, it is also possible 
that positive NGO–TNC relations could improve TNC willingness to address 
workers’  rights issues transnationally and that this in turn could improve the 
possibilities of unions advancing their agenda via union–TNC relations. Similar 
studies of how union–TNC relations affect NGOs would also be interesting and would 
improve our understanding of union–NGO–TNC relations and the emerging 
transnational industrial relations system. 
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A final inter-organisational area in need of more research concerns the effect of inter-
organisational relations within a specific type of actor on transnational industrial 
relations systems. For example, Egels-Zandén (2008b) demonstrates that conflicts 
between enterprise-, national-, and global-level unions greatly influenced the process 
and content of a recently signed IFA. Do similar conflicts exist between different 
NGOs and TNCs and, if so, how do such inter-organisational conflicts within actor 
groups affect the emerging transnational system?  
Macro: Structures and underlying models 
Structures: Who is an actor and who has influence? 
In addition to the micro- and meso-level research gaps discussed above, there are also 
research gaps on a macro level. In 1958, John T. Dunlop published his seminal book 
popularising and elaborating the notion that industrial relations systems comprise 
three types of actors: i) “a hierarchy of managers and their representatives in 
supervision”, ii) “a hierarchy of workers (non-managerial) and any spokesman”, and 
iii) “specialized governmental agencies (and specialized private agencies created by 
the first two actors) concerned with workers, enterprise, and their relationships” 
(Dunlop, 1958, p. 7). Dunlop’ s work has been highly influential, and subsequent 
industrial relations research has almost exclusively focused on the relationships 
between these actors (e.g., Bamber and Lansbury, 1998; Emery and Thorsrud, 1969; 
Hedlund and Otterbeck, 1977; Tannenbaum, 1965). Consequently, the question of 
who the actors are in industrial relations has been neglected by most industrial 
relations scholars, as their research has been based on the a priori assumption that 
these are the only three actors in the industrial relations system (e.g., Abbott, 1998; 
Kaufman, 2004). 
With the emergence of transnational industrial relations systems, there is a need to 
revisit Dunlop’ s (1958) definition of the actors in industrial relations. First, if it is 
correct that the recent changes in industrial relations indeed point in the direction of 
‘governance without government’  systems, it is necessary to critically analyse 
whether or not governments should be regarded as actors in transnational industrial 
relations. Furthermore, if governments are actors, what type of actors are they? 
Comparing the roles of governmental organisations in the emergence of transnational 
workers’  rights governance systems in the USA (Bartley, 2007) and Sweden 
(Ählström and Egels-Zandén, 2008) has been interesting. While governmental 
organisations have been highly involved in the process in the USA, indicating that 
governments should still count as actors, governmental organisations have rarely been 
involved in the Swedish setting, indicating that governments should not be treated as 
actors in transnational industrial relations systems. Hence, existing empirical evidence 
provides mixed results regarding the actor status of governments in transnational 
industrial relations, making both research explaining these divergent findings and 
additional empirical research interesting to pursue. 
Just as the actor status of governmental organisations could be questioned, the status 
of labour unions could be questioned in transnational industrial relations systems 
based on codes of conduct (as most systems are today). The mere fact that a labour 
union perspective is almost completely lacking in the business ethics literature and 
that codes of conduct are usually presented as part of the CSR movement (as, for 
example, indicated in code of conduct research mainly being published in business 
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ethics journals) raises doubts about the role of labour unions in transnational industrial 
relations (cf. Nijhof et al., 2003; Bondy et al., 2004; Logsdon and Wood, 2006). 
While there is no doubt that labour unions are attempting to establish themselves as 
influential actors in transnational industrial relations, for example, by promoting IFAs 
(e.g., Muller-Camen et al., 2001; Wills, 2001; Chang and Wong, 2005; Royle, 2005; 
Andersen, 2006; Turnbull, 2006; Waddington, 2006; Doellgast and Greer, 2007), the 
limited success in terms of the corporate adoption of IFAs indicates that labour 
unions’  aspirations to actor status may not have been realised.  
Third, in Dunlop’ s (1958) framing of industrial relations, NGOs were not considered 
actors. However, existing studies of codes of conduct and IFAs indicate that NGOs 
play a key role in transnational workers’  rights governance (e.g., Frenkel, 2001; van 
Tulder and Kolk, 2001; Sethi, 2002; O’ Rourke, 2003; Roberts, 2003; Eade, 2004; 
Spooner, 2004; Riisgaard, 2005). Does this mean that NGOs now qualify as actors in 
industrial relations, and, if so, are they the same type of actors as TNCs, unions, and 
governments? Finally, if NGOs could be considered actors, what about the actor 
status of financial investors and other stakeholders that have been shown to be highly 
influential in terms of TNCs’  CSR practices (e.g., Schueth, 2003; Guay et al., 2004; 
Sparkes and Cowton, 2004; Sobczak, 2007)? 
Clearly, the question of who is an actor in industrial relations systems is linked to the 
more general question of the distribution of influence among actors in transnational 
industrial relations. Here, more research is needed analysing, for example, how the 
distribution of actor influence differs between systems based on codes of conduct and 
those based on IFAs. It seems reasonable to expect TNC–union–government actors to 
have the most influence in IFA-based systems, while NGOs and other stakeholders 
could be expected to have comparatively more influence in code of conduct-based 
systems. However, this must be empirically studied and systematically analysed. 
So far, the discussion in this paper of actor status and influence has implicitly focused 
on actors in developed countries in Europe and the USA. What about the distribution 
of influence between actors in developed and in developing countries? Existing 
research indicates that transnational industrial relations systems are established 
because actors in developed countries are unsatisfied with existing national systems in 
developing countries (e.g., van Tulder and Kolk, 2001; Roberts, 2003; Bartley, 2007). 
Given this, it is reasonable to expect TNCs, unions, NGOs, and governments in 
developing countries to have only limited influence in the emerging transnational 
industrial relations systems. However, more research is needed to confirm this 
hypothesis and to analyse how actors in developing countries perceive and strategise 
vis-à-vis the emerging transnational systems. 
Underlying ideas: Bargaining and supply vs. rules and demand 
So far, conflicts in the emergent transnational industrial relations systems have been 
discussed on the micro and meso levels in terms of conflicting tools (codes of conduct 
versus IFAs) and conflicts between and within actors (TNCs, unions, and NGOs). 
Interpreted on a macro level, the existing conflicts between tools and actors can be 
understood as representations of more fundamental conflicts between divergent 
underlying ideas of how to govern workers’  rights transnationally. An analysis of such 
clashes of underlying ideas is critical for understanding what ideas the emerging 
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transnational industrial relations systems embody and for understanding what is at 
stake in the ongoing development and conflicts in the transnational systems. 
There are several potential analyses of what underlying ideas are competing for 
dominance in the emerging transnational systems, and to exemplify what such 
analyses could look like, I will briefly highlight two potential macro-level 
interpretations. First, there seems to be a conflict between a universal rules idea 
manifested in codes of conduct and supported by NGOs, and a bargaining idea 
manifested in IFAs and supported by unions. The code of conduct tool is based on the 
underlying idea that trust comes from outcomes in the form of pre-defined minimum 
requirements (cf. Mintzberg, 1983). As such, definitions of workers’  rights are 
generally defined and universally determined. Consequently, trust is codified or, in 
other words, institutionalised as definitions of workers’  rights are lifted from 
interpersonal relationships and networks into regulatory frameworks. This underlying 
idea has close links to the CSR movement with its focus on universal principles (for 
example, the ten UN Global Compact principles), as well as on a more general level 
to ideas of an ” audit society”  (Power, 1997). In contrast, the IFA tool is based on the 
idea of building trust from the process of (collective) bargaining rather than from 
outcomes per se (cf. Mintzberg, 1983). Hence, rather than trust residing in 
institutionalised codified rules, as in the universal rules idea, trust resides in 
interpersonal relations in the bargaining idea. In practice, such a bargaining idea 
would mean relatively few general workers’  rights regulations, the specifics being 
determined through local negotiations by the parties involved. 
Second, there also seems to be a conflict between consumer- (i.e., demand) driven 
ideas manifested in codes of conduct and supported by NGOs and labour- (i.e., 
supply) driven ideas manifested in IFAs and supported by unions. NGO pressure 
usually aims to influence TNC access to capital by challenging their legitimacy on 
financial and consumer markets (e.g., van Tulder and Kolk, 2001; Roberts, 2003; 
Frenkel and Kim, 2004), thereby having an adverse impact on the demand for 
(irresponsible) TNCs’  shares and products. This influence is exerted through acts of 
‘political consumerism’  of which the code of conduct tool is an integral part (cf. 
Micheletti et al., 2004). In contrast, union pressure aims at controlling the supply of 
labour by collectively representing workers (e.g., Tannenbaum, 1965). Unions employ 
this control through collective bargaining while exercising a credible threat of 
industrial action within and, occasionally, across sectors (e.g., IDE, 1981; Bamber and 
Lansbury, 1998). The major strengths of this approach are its ability to limit the 
supply of labour to TNCs and its built-in mechanisms for monitoring TNC behaviour 
through local bargaining. These underlying ideas of controlling supply are embodied 
in the IFA tool highly focused on improving union bargaining rights.  
These two brief examples illustrate that micro-level conflicts between tools and meso-
level conflicts between NGOs and unions could be interpreted as representations of 
fundamental macro-level conflicts between alternate ways of governing workers’  
rights transnationally. It also shows that to understand what is at stake in the emerging 
transnational governance systems, it is critical that future research systematically 
analyse these clashes between competing underlying ideas of how workers’  rights 
should be governed. 
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Interaction: Relations between national and transnational systems 
National systems influencing transnational systems 
So far, I have outlined a research agenda for improving our understanding of the 
emerging transnational industrial relations systems in isolation from national 
industrial relations systems. However, to fully understand transnational industrial 
relations systems, research is also needed into how national systems influence the 
content of transnational systems. National industrial relations systems differ in their 
underlying ideas; for example, Anglo-Saxon countries such as the USA, the UK, and 
Canada are strongly based on rules and regulation with limited space for bargaining, 
while northern European countries such as Sweden, Norway, Germany, and the 
Netherlands are strongly based on bargaining with limited regulations (e.g., IDE, 
1981; Bamber and Lansbury, 1998; Piazza, 2002). Given this, it is reasonable to 
expect US, British, and Canadian firms to be more likely to adopt codes of conduct 
(based on a universal rules idea) than Swedish, Norwegian, German, and Dutch firms, 
and conversely to expect Swedish, Norwegian, German, and Dutch firms to be more 
likely to adopt IFAs (based on a bargaining idea) than US, British, and Canadian 
firms. Preliminary support for these hypotheses is found in existing code of conduct 
and IFA research (cf. Hammer, 2005; Helin and Sandström, 2007), but more 
systematic research is needed to confirm them.  
Another promising avenue for future research would be to study how actor influence 
in national industrial relations is translated into transnational industrial relations. For 
example, labour unions are more influential in the Nordic countries than in the USA. 
Does this mean that NGOs – as the second type of workers’  representatives – have 
more opportunity to gain influence in transnational industrial relations systems 
initiated in the USA than in the Nordic countries? Furthermore, Nordic governments 
play only an indirect role in Nordic industrial relations systems (i.e., these systems are 
based on a TNC–union bargaining idea) as compared to the US government, which 
plays a more direct role (the US national system being based more on a universal rule 
idea). Does this explain why the US government has been involved in the emergent 
code of conduct-based transnational industrial relations systems (i.e., in systems based 
on a universal rule idea) (Bartley, 2007), while the Swedish government has not been 
involved in the emergent code of conduct-based systems (Ählström and Egels-
Zandén, 2008)? 
Third, how do the characteristics of national industrial relations systems in developing 
countries influence the emergent transnational industrial relations systems? If the 
characteristics of, for example, US, British, Nordic, and German national systems 
have influenced the emergent systems, will the characteristics of, for example, 
Chinese, Indian, Vietnamese, and Brazilian national systems do the same? As noted 
above, the rise of transnational industrial relations systems has been driven by 
European and US actors, so it is reasonable to expect that national industrial relations 
systems in developing countries have less influence than national systems in 
developed countries. However, this conclusion has yet to be supported by empirical 
evidence. 
Finally, by discussing the relations between national and transnational systems, it is 
possible to question how “ transnational”  the transnational industrial relations systems 
really are. For example, Egels-Zandén (2007) shows that the contents of codes of 
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conduct are strongly based on local law (in that case, Chinese labour law). This is 
most clearly seen when discussing minimum wages and the number of allowed 
overtime working hours (two common criteria in both codes of conduct and IFAs), 
since these two criteria are usually based on national labour law. What then makes the 
transnational industrial relations systems “ transnational” ? Is it the content of the 
system? The adding of TNC-led, rather than government-led, auditing of codes of 
conduct and indirectly national labour law? Or perhaps delegating responsibility for 
non-compliance to TNCs rather than to national governments? Reasonably, one would 
assume it is a combination of these aspects, but future research could provide much 
clarity by teasing out the arguments of what makes transnational systems 
“ transnational” . In doing this, researchers could also discuss whether or not it is 
reasonable to talk about a transnational industrial relations system or whether it more 
appropriate to talk about multiple transnational systems. For example, is there a 
Swedish–Chinese–IFA transnational system, a US–Vietnamese–code of conduct 
system, and so on?   
Transnational systems influencing national systems 
While there is limited research into how national industrial relations systems influence 
transnational systems, there has been more research into how transnational systems 
influence national systems. Specifically, researchers have been interested in whether 
or not the emerging transnational systems crowd out national systems. This research is 
often linked to the debate on ‘governance without government’  discussed above (e.g., 
Strange, 1996). However, despite extensive conceptual debate, there has been limited 
empirical research into the crowd-out effect, the recent study by Bartley (2005) being 
a notable exception. Bartley (2005) demonstrated that the relationship between 
transnational and national systems is complex and, while his results partially 
supported the crowd-out argument, they also identified instances in which the systems 
fed into each other. Since Bartley (2005) was solely focused on codes of conduct and 
there do not seem to be any similar studies of the potential crowd-out effects of IFAs, 
this would be a promising avenue for future research. Furthermore, Bartley (2005) 
was focused on crowd-out effects on national US systems, and it would be interesting 
to test whether his findings also apply to national systems in developing countries. 
Most likely, there will be more crowding-out effects on national systems in 
developing countries, since transnational systems are mainly formed to address issues 
in developing – not developed – countries, and existing national systems in 
developing countries are less stable than those in developed countries. 
It is also possible that, rather than crowding out national systems, transnational 
industrial relations systems may alter national systems. For example, emerging 
transnational systems based on codes of conduct (i.e., based on a universal rule idea) 
could discredit national systems based on bargaining ideas (such as those in the 
Nordic countries). For example, critics could question why Swedish companies 
should enforce legal minimum wages in developing countries when legal minimum 
wages do not exist in Sweden (in Sweden the minimum wage is regulated through 
TNC–union collective agreements rather than through labour law)? Hence, interesting 
avenues for future research include how codes of conduct-based transnational systems 
influence bargaining-based national systems, and how IFA-based transnational 
systems influence rule-based national systems (such as the US national industrial 
relations system).  
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Beyond studying the translation of underlying ideas from transnational to national 
systems, it would also interesting to study whether, and if so, how, actor influence is 
translated from transnational to national systems. While it is clear that actor influence 
is at least partly translated from national to transnational systems, does translation 
work in the reverse direction as well? For example, can NGOs translate their 
influence from transnational to national systems and emerge as actors in national 
systems as well? Logically, it seems more likely that one would find such translation 
of influence in developing than developed countries with, for example, local NGOs 
involved in implementing codes of conduct or local unions involved in implementing 
IFAs being able to leverage these experiences and networks to advance their positions 
in national industrial relations systems. This is especially so, considering that the 
contents of the transnational systems – as discussed above – is strongly based on 
national labour law. Hence, a local NGO, by doing codes of conduct audits, could  
end up doing more auditing of local labour law than local governmental organisations, 
potentially allowing them to emerge as influential actors in national industrial 
relations systems as well. 
Directions for empirical research 
It is obviously impossible to outline here how researchers could examine all the above 
research areas, though some general directions and promising suggestions can be 
provided. First, at a micro (tools) level, the contents of codes of conduct and IFAs are 
readily available on TNC and labour union websites, making quantitative comparisons 
of their contents a relatively easy starting point for researchers interested in 
transnational workers’  rights governance. To move beyond content comparisons and 
approach the question of whether codes of conduct and IFAs are complementary or 
conflicting tools, a more qualitative case study approach is probably necessary due to 
the complexity of the issue. Such an approach should focus both on whether adopting 
codes of conduct facilitates or hinders IFA adoption (and vice versa) and on whether 
adopting codes of conduct facilitates or hinders the formation of local unions (often a 
prerequisite for IFA adoption). 
Second, at a micro (intra-organisational) level, researchers could use historical and 
current empirical data to analyse how the NGO preference for codes of conduct, 
rather than IFAs, has emerged. What, for example, were the key NGOs influencing 
this position, the key decision points, and the main arguments in favour of codes of 
conduct and against IFAs? Another promising approach would be to design a 
preferably cross-national survey of union, NGO, and TNC representatives, inquiring 
into their preferences for codes of conduct versus IFAs and the reasons for them. 
Regarding the implementation and effectiveness of codes of conduct versus IFAs, 
researchers need to make credible comparisons between TNCs with codes and those 
with IFAs, for example, comparing implementation processes and effectiveness in 
TNCs that differ in their chosen tools for operationalising workers’  rights, while being 
similar in terms of industry, country of origin, size, etc. 
Third, at a meso level, previous research provides numerous explanations of NGO–
union conflicts related to differences in organisation (e.g., Braun and Gearhart, 2004), 
gender (e.g., Huyer, 2004), and class (e.g., Gallin, 2000). Future research could 
usefully operationalise these general explanations into hypotheses to be tested, for 
example, in multiple case studies or surveys of NGO and union representatives. By 
including TNC representatives in such surveys or multiple case studies, researchers 
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could simultaneously analyse the third-party effects of NGO–union, NGO–TNC, and 
union–TNC relations and conflicts within a specific type of actor. 
Fourth, at a macro (actor status) level, hypotheses of whether or not governments, 
unions, and NGOs in developed and developing countries are actors in transnational 
industrial relations systems could be developed based on previous industrial relations 
research (e.g., Dunlop, 1958) and on re-readings of existing empirical descriptions of 
the emergence of transnational systems (e.g., Bartley, 2007; Ählström and Egels-
Zandén, 2008). These hypotheses could then be tested and refined in further case 
studies or surveys, arriving at new insights into how to define an “ actor”  in 
transnational industrial relations systems. 
Fifth, at a macro (underlying ideas) level, the underlying ideas – such as outcome 
versus process and demand versus supply focus – inducing conflicts between workers’  
rights tools and unions and NGOs need to be further theorized and operationalized. 
Linking research into the underlying ideas of the union movement (e.g., Dunlop, 
1958) with the social movement literature (e.g., Kaldor, 2003) would be a promising 
starting point for such an endeavour. The usefulness of the developed theoretical 
distinctions could then be tested in interviews aimed at uncovering the underlying 
ideas of NGO and union representatives’  visions of transnational industrial relations 
systems. 
Sixth, at an interaction level, cross-national quantitative studies could shed light on 
the link between national and transnational industrial relations systems, for example, 
by testing how the national industrial relations system in the country in which a 
TNC’ s headquarters are located (cf. Marquis et al., 2007) influences the TNC’ s 
likelihood of adopting codes of conduct versus IFAs. Furthermore, future research 
could start to discern how national industrial relations systems in developing countries 
influence emergent transnational industrial relations systems, for example, by 
analysing differences between how transnational systems are implemented in 
countries with significantly different institutional structures, for example, China 
versus India. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I have demonstrated that workers’  rights governance has undergone 
fundamental change to the extent that transnational industrial relations systems have 
emerged, existing parallel to, while being significantly different from, national 
industrial relations systems. While previous research has extensively covered certain 
aspects of this change (most notably, the emergence of the code of conduct 
governance tool), the existing detail-focused research agenda needs to be 
complemented by a more holistic research agenda, in order to fully grasp the 
significance of this ongoing change. This paper has outlined such a holistic research 
agenda covering micro-, meso-, macro-, and interaction aspects of transnational 
workers’  rights governance. Fulfilling this research agenda would be both 
challenging, as it requires combining the so far divergent industrial relations and 
business ethics research streams, and rewarding, as it provides ample scope for 
promising future research. Most importantly, fulfilling this research agenda is 
essential for advancing both business ethics and industrial relations research and for 
contributing to practitioners’  understanding of the emergent workers’  rights 
governance systems they are currently creating. 
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